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The original objective of the study was to monitor and analyze the inefficiencies in Lending Club’s Peer-to-
Peer (P2P) secondary market, in order to exploit these inefficiencies for a risk-free return.  Upon a three-
month examination and analysis of the secondary market, the findings indicate that arbitrage conditions do 
not exist as a result of the observed volume of the marketplace being vastly lower than initially believed.  
Only 0.44% of note listing instances on Lending Club’s secondary market over the three-month period 
resulted in successful trades.  As a consequence, investors assume a purported level of liquidity that is 
never met, thus they may incur a higher level of risk than initially estimated on the primary market at the 
time of issuance. 
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Introduction to Peer-to-Peer Lending 
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending is a method of providing credit to individual 
borrowers through a pooled investment of individual investors.  Generally, P2P loans are 
sought by borrowers as an unsecured personal loan and are funded by investors looking 
to invest in alternative assets for the purpose of either speculation, in the case of risky 
borrowers, or long-term investment, in the case of highly credit-worthy borrowers.  This 
type of lending has gained significant market share over the past decade, with many 
investors moving from traditional financial instruments in favor of more speculative 
alternatives.  As an example of magnitude, Lending Club, the largest P2P marketplace in 
the United States, issued over $33.5 billion in loans from 2010 through 2017, according 
to their website.  Although this amount is a blip on the radar compared to the grand scale 
of traditional financial instruments, such as bond and equity markets, the growth of 
alternative financial assets, specifically P2P loans, warrants more targeted academic 
research of the industry and market. 
The process by which P2P loans are funded is similar in nature to crowd-funding 
services where one individual (the borrower) places a request for a loan on Lending 
Club’s marketplace and then investors pledge a chosen amount to the origination of the 
loan.  Each investor in the loan receives a note upon origination with principal equal to 
the amount pledged and a stated amortization schedule of principal repayment and 
interest over the life of the loan.  As a result of this derivation of many notes from a 
single loan, many identical notes in the marketplace exist, all representing a partial share 
of the same loan.  Theoretically, these notes are identical assets, therefore the value of 
each should be equal.  One exception to this rule is that the principal amount may vary, 
thus causing the value of a particular note to differ from the rest of the identically 
characterized note pool; however, this is rare as the standard, and minimum, pledged 
amount is $25, which most investors follow to limit their cash invested in a single note as 
a means of diversification. 
Traditionally, Lending Club investors lent money to borrowers with the 
understanding that monthly interest and principal payments would be received over the 
life of the loan (36 to 60 months), thus forfeiting liquidity for the length of the term.  As a 
result, investors had no method of selling off a note when in need of liquidity or if the 
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note’s risk level changed.  For example, a borrower’s credit score may go down over the 
life of the loan, thus increasing the probability of loan default, as well as the possibility of 
loss for the investor.  In response to this, Lending Club created a secondary market where 
investors may list notes held in their account and purchase notes listed by other investors.   
This marketplace is hosted by a third-party brokerage, FOLIOfn Inc., and is referenced as 
‘FOLIOfn’.  In addition to providing liquidity, this secondary market enables investors to 
speculate on notes after their origination, which creates a new wave of investment 
opportunities.  For instance, an investor may attempt to profit by purchasing notes where 
the borrower’s FICO score has decreased, thus causing original investors to place notes 
on the secondary market at a discount.  In contrast, an investor may purchase notes from 
the secondary market that have shown strong performance, which would likely be listed 
at a premium but provide a lower level of risk relative to the note’s stated interest rate.  
These speculative investments are available because when an individual decides to list a 
note on the secondary market, an investor has full discretion, aside from a few parameters 
enforced by Lending Club (e.g. a note holder cannot list a note when the loan is in 
default), to list the note at any price, thus causing notes to be listed at varying premiums 
and discounts.  As a result of these unpredictable premiums and discounts, it is observed 
that all notes derived from the same loan are not listed at the same premiums or discounts 
and are instead priced irrationally on the marketplace.  This mispricing occurs because of 
the inefficiency of the Lending Club secondary market, as note holders seemingly place 
notes at a premium or discount without any reference to the fair market value of the note 
in relation to its pool of identical notes.  Additionally, the market lacks transparency from 
the investor perspective, as there is no easily accessible method for searching the 
available notes for one particular loan, which restricts the gathering of relevant note 
information for any particular pool of notes.  This lack of transparency, coupled with 
irrational decision making, causes notes that are identical to be priced at vastly different 
premiums and discounts.   
As a result of these note pricing divergences from any understood fair market 
value, an investor has the opportunity to acquire the same asset at a variety of different 
price points, thus theoretically providing an opportunity for arbitrage to be performed.  If 
the arbitrage condition held true, an individual investor would be able to profit by 
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purchasing underpriced notes and re-listing these notes at a fair market value.  This thesis 
examined the unique condition of Lending Club’s secondary marketplace in hopes of 
acting on this theoretical arbitrage condition.  Throughout the data collection and initial 
analysis, it was discovered that the volume of trading on Lending Club’s secondary 
market, FOLIOfn, was insufficient to provide conditions necessary for arbitrage.  As a 
result, the discussion of this thesis transitioned to the lack of liquidity provided by the 
marketplace and how this lack of liquidity poses a threat to investors. 
 
 
Peer-to-Peer Secondary Market Arbitrage 
Although the results of the data collection and analysis proved that the secondary 
marketplace lacked the conditions to perform arbitrage, this section outlines the initial 
layout of the trading strategy that would have been performed in such conditions. 
By tracking Lending Club’s secondary market, FOLIOfn, it is possible to derive 
the fair market value of each pool of notes associated with a loan and act upon this 
knowledge for profit.  After deriving the fair value of each note on the marketplace, it 
would be possible to purchase notes priced below fair value and immediately trade them 
at fair value to gain a marginal return.  This strategy works in theory; however, to derive 
a fair value for any given note, an investor must have knowledge of a note’s previous 
trading activity.  The initial problem was that the only data available from Lending Club 
was the current listings of the secondary market at any given time, making it impossible 
to observe the actual historical trading activity.  Additionally, it can be theorized that 
notes priced at a premium far away from the observable median never sell, thus using 
them as estimates for the fair value of notes among their identical set is erroneous.  
Because of these limitations, it was necessary to gather more data from the secondary 
market in order to build a dataset whereby a fair market value for any particular set of 
identical notes might have been derived.  This dataset was built by tracking the activity of 
the open listings of the secondary market at one-hour intervals and comparing the current 
and previous hours, which allowed for an assumption to be made that a note was placed 
and removed, or ‘fell out’ of the dataset, between the hours.  If a note fell out, it is 
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understood to either have been traded or pulled from the market by its current holder as a 
result of listing expiration, re-pricing, or manual removal. 
The objective was to derive the fair value for each pool of identical notes by 
recording every instance of a note’s fall out.  From tracking this, it was possible to 
associate each instance with the execution of a trade, whereby the premium or discount 
that the note traded at was observed.  By recording these instances, it was then possible to 
derive the fair value for each pool of identical notes associated with every loan originated 
on Lending Club.  After each pool of identical notes was assigned a fair value, this value 
would be used in the open marketplace to search for notes priced below their pool’s fair 
value.  By utilizing a weighted-average that emphasizes recent trades, an automated 
trading platform would have been deployed to purchase currently available notes that are 
underpriced relative to their pool’s derived fair value and then re-listed at the fair value.  
In doing so, a marginal profit would have been obtained and the arbitrage condition 
proven true. 
If the arbitrage condition was proven to exist and the trading was successful, the 
opportunity to profit would diminish over time as a result of shrinking note pricing 
divergences due to increased market efficiency.  In order to continue reaping profits from 
this strategy, the pool of identical notes would need to be expanded through combining 
similar loans into pools of similar notes.  Although straying from arbitrage, as the notes 
in a similar combined pool are not identical assets, the pools would exhibit characteristics 
that cause them to trade identically.  These pools would have been created by performing 
machine learning through K-Means Clustering on the characteristics of every loan 
originated through Lending Club based on the trading patterns tracked from the 
secondary market.  By clustering loans with similar characteristics and then refining 
those clusters based upon each note’s trading activity, pools of almost-identical notes 
would have been developed.  The previously defined arbitrage technique would then have 
been performed on these new pools of almost-identical notes, thus theoretically 
generating profits from individual note mispricing relative to the fair value of almost-
identical pools.  This pool enlargement would have allowed for a proprietary expansion 
of the theorized arbitrage condition that is believed to exist within the secondary market 
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and provide opportunities to reap continued profits from incongruent secondary market 
note pricing. 
To summarize, the original purpose of this thesis was to track Lending Club’s 
secondary market for P2P notes, in order to derive the fair value for each set of identical 
notes.  Upon finding this fair value for each pool of notes, arbitrage would have been 
attempted by algorithmically purchasing notes that are priced below this threshold and 
placed back on the market at their fair value.  If this strategy was successful, and the 
arbitrage condition held true, the set of identical notes related to a single loan would have 
been expanded to include all loans of similar characteristics as defined by a K-Means 
Clustering algorithm, which would have been refined through adjusting the set of 
variables and the number of the clusters, thus providing a trading strategy that could exist 
in perpetuity, regardless of arbitrage condition. 
 
 
Data Analysis Results 
As displayed in Table 1, every note movement on Lending Club’s secondary 
market, FOLIOfn, was recorded from June 1, 2017 to August 20, 2017.  Throughout this 
time frame, there were a total of 18,731,474 note listings that resulted in either a note 
being traded, removed from the marketplace, or listed but disposition not determined due 
to the methodology employed to categorize the movement.  From this analysis, it can be 
determined that 16,705,880 notes were removed from the marketplace because of 
expiration, re-pricing, or manual removal.  83,265 notes were confirmed traded, whereby 
the notes moved accounts.  Additionally, 1,942,329 notes were not able to be determined 
as a result of the methodology employed, which requires at least two instances of a note 
being listed.  As a consequence, all notes that remained listed at the end of the study, as 
well as those only listed on the marketplace a single time, comprise this undetermined 
category; however, there is no reason to assume these notes would stray far from the 
observed mean likelihood that a note is traded. 
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Data Capture and Analysis Methodology 
To accomplish the analysis of Lending Club’s secondary market, FOLIOfn, a 
database was created to record the information of every note listing between June 1, 2017 
to August 20, 2017.  The data was retrieved directly from the secondary market, stored in 
a database built in MySQL, and hosted on an Amazon Web Services RDS instance, 
which allowed for continuous network availability and the ability to automatically scale 
in size to support newly appended data. 
The hourly data collection process involved the retrieval of open listings from 
FOLIOfn, which was accomplished through a Python script running on a local Linux 
machine.  This script ran hourly through the use of Cron, which is a command-line utility 
used to schedule tasks, and sent a request to FOLIOfn’s current listings endpoint.  This 
open endpoint provided a complete set of open listings in a Comma Separated Value 
(CSV) file, which was stored in a Python Pandas dataframe.  This dataframe was 
compared to the previous hour’s dataframe, thus allowing the Python script to determine 
which listings were already in existence, which listings were new within the hour, and 
which listings no longer existed on the marketplace.  Listings that were available in the 
previous hour’s dataframe, but not the current dataframe, were determined to have been 
removed from the marketplace through the process of a trade, listing expiration, re-
pricing, or manual removal.  These instances were recorded and appended to the AWS-
hosted MySQL database. 
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After the completion of the data recording, there were 18,713,474 listings stored 
in the AWS MySQL database.  A MySQL script was written in order to assign each 
listing as a trade, not a trade, or indeterminate.  This script compared each listing’s 
‘OrderId’ field, a unique identifier, to a future listing’s ‘OrderId’ of the same note, which 
allowed for tracing an individual note’s movements across the marketplace.  Because the 
‘OrderId’ field changes when a note moves from one account to another, it can be 
determined that a listing where the next occurrence’s ‘OrderId’ of the same note is 
different than its ‘OrderId’ constitutes a trade.  If the ‘OrderId’ field remains the same 
after observing a new listing of the same note, it can be determined that this listing is not 
a trade.  A limitation of this algorithm is that a listing’s result cannot be determined if 
there is not a future listing of the same note, thus every final listing instance of a note 
cannot be determined.  This limitation describes the 1,942,329 listings that could not be 
determined as either a trade, expiration, re-pricing or manual removal. 
 
 
Implications of Analysis and Results 
Lending Club investors assume the credit and liquidity risk associated with 
funding P2P loans on the platform.  Through the existence of a secondary market on 
FOLIOfn, Lending Club is able to promote an alternative to long-term investment, 
whereby the investor has the option to trade a portfolio of notes, as a means of providing 
liquidity.  As this analysis proves, the assumed liquidity of the secondary market far 
exceeds the observed levels.  As such, investors lack a proper marketplace to trade their 
portfolio of notes before maturity, which increases the risk associated with their primary 
market investment.  This analysis leaves open for exploration the question of whether 
investors underestimate liquidity risk as a result of believing that the option to trade notes 
post-issuance on the secondary market exists.  If this is the case, then investors are taking 
on more risk than initially thought, thus diminishing the value of these investments.  
Ultimately, this lack of liquidity is misleading to investors, as it purports an option for 
secondary market trading that rarely exists, and needs to be addressed by Lending Club 
so that it can be better understood by investors. 
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Limitations and Further Research 
The research and analysis performed for the thesis have limitations as a result of 
the data collection method and indicator used to define a trade on FOLIOfn’s secondary 
marketplace.  Due to the private nature of Lending Club and FOLIOfn data, this analysis 
was performed independently and without direct assistance from either of these entities.  
The data collection was performed by downloading the data from FOLIOfn’s open 
listings every hour, with few exceptions, such as down time due to local network outages, 
which leaves open the possibility that specific note listing instances may not have been 
captured by the program.  Additionally, by using an algorithm to define the end result of 
note listings, the possibility exists that not all indicators of a successful trade were 
confirmed.  These limitations result in a dataset that may not be perfectly congruent with 
Lending Club’s private data; however, this dataset is the outcome of primary research and 
analysis that was performed using an indicator, the accuracy of which was confirmed by 
a Lending Club employee.  Specifically, the ‘OrderId’ field used to describe the 
movement of a note listing from one user account to another, thus indicating a successful 
trade, was verified in a phone call to Lending Club’s investor relations team. 
As described, this study was limited by the difficulties associated with data 
collection, as a result of the privacy of the data involved.  Further research on this topic, 
utilizing data directly from Lending Club and FOLIOfn is necessary to confirm the 
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